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We empirically investigate the e®ect of trade liberalization on trade
tax revenues applying panel-data methods to a large sample of African
countries from the period 1970-2000. The goal of this paper is to
determine whether controlling for macroeconomic features of African
economies and taking into account the existence of political constraints
that might either support or weaken the power of the trade reform, a
change in trade policy has a positive or negative e®ect on trade tax
revenues. We ¯nd that there exists a large trade o® between a greater
degree of openness to international trade and the revenue collected from
import and export taxation. We document the existence of a La®er ef-
fect between trade openness and trade tax revenues and stress the impor-
tance of exchange rate policies along with the stability of the macroeco-
nomic environment in determining trade reform outcomes. Interestingly,
we also provide evidence of the relevance of government credibility in
explaining trade tax revenues.
¤I am grateful to Emilio Colombo and Fabrizio Carmignani for for useful comments and
insightful discussions.
11 Introduction
One of the most widely accepted theories in economics claims that there exists
a positive relationship between a higher degree of openness to international
trade and economic growth. As a consequence, a trade liberalization reform is
largely considered as a growth-enhancing strategy because of its positive e®ect
on the promotion of e±ciency, the improvement in international competition
and the expansion of the trade volume.1 The last decades have witnessed a
large decrease of trade closure altogether, with many countries trying to ¯nd
new forms of trade agreement under the guidance of international organiza-
tions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. One of the aims of
the Doha Round Agenda, for example, was to create new trade opportuni-
ties to developing countries following a sharp decrease on their trade barrier
level. Despite the clear link between trade and growth and the pressure from
the international authorities, a high number of developing and least developed
countries (LDCs) is still experiencing a high level of either tari® and non tari®
trade barriers. Among many, one of the strongest reasons behind this reluc-
tance to liberalize trade stems from the uncertainty related to the revenue and
¯scal consequences following a drastic and needed further reduction in tari®
barriers. As shown in ¯gure 1, in the African continent trade tax revenue rep-
resents more than 30 percent of the total tax revenue collected.2 Moreover, as
shown in ¯gure 2, revenue obtained from trade taxation represents a very high
share of GDP in these countries. This is in line with the results in Khattry and
Rao (2002) which show the existence of a strong negative relationship between
the share of trade taxes on total tax revenue and the level of development.
A good trade liberalization reform is complex and should consist of di®er-
ent intermediate steps. This is particularly true in developing countries where
trade protection is built on several types of trade barriers, ranging from quan-
titative restrictions to tari®-barriers. This complexity makes any attempt to
predict a general ¯nal tax revenue outcome a di±cult task. In fact, di®erent
conclusions can be drawn depending on the timing and the components of
a trade liberalisation reform which can vary substantially among economies,
depending on their initial conditions, priorities, pressure from lobbies, and ad-
1See Ades and Glaeser (1994), and Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), Ben-David
(1993), Dollar (1992), Edwards (1992), Krueger (1998), Sachs and Warner (1995).
2This result is in line with the one found in a recent studies of the African Trade Policy
Center (2004) who claims that in recent years trade tax revenues accounted for about 34
percent of total revenue in the least developed countries of Africa, more than 19 points higher
than for developing countries as a whole. In the remaining African non LDCs countries, the
share of customs duties to overall revenue is around 22 percent, still higher than the average
15 percent for developing countries.
2ministrative ability, (Ebrill et al. 1999). Theoretically, worries about revenue
security should represent a serious problem only at the later stage of a trade
reform because a sound reform should be sequenced so that initial e®ort to
reduce import barriers focuses on quantitative restrictions (QRs) and other
non-tari® barriers (NTBs) in order to mitigate the potential revenue losses or
the potential increase in import that could lead to balance of payments prob-
lems. Only at a second stage, after securing revenues through measures as
tari±cation of quotas and after the implementation of a ¯scal reform aimed at
collecting revenue via domestic taxation, measures to reform import tari®s can
be implemented. This procedure would in fact preserve total tax revenue from
falling, would strengthen the administrative competence of the government,
and would enable the economy to reach higher e±ciency which represents the
long-run aim of a trade liberalization reform. As suggested by the literature
3, appropriate measures to reform import tari®s consist in reductions in the
maximum and higher tari®s rate, reduction in the number of tari® bands,
conversion of speci¯c tari®s into ad valorem rates, consolidation of other im-
port taxes or charges into a single rate, and reduction or elimination of tari®
exemptions for individuals, organizations, or groups. Nonetheless, the willing-
ness and the ability of a developing country to engage in an e®ective trade
reform represents a di±cult task in particular in Africa where the resistance
to liberalize trade could be ultimately seen as the result of dramatically low
administrative capacity and political will which prevent these countries either
from implementing credible ¯scal reforms, aimed at broadening the tax base of
the domestic economy, and from improving their ability to collect alternative
forms of revenues to custom duty ones (that are relatively easy to collect). As
explained by Khattry (2001), e®orts to liberalize trade may result in revenue
losses and may worsen the ¯scal de¯cit if the potential decrease in trade tax
revenue is not replaced by revenue from domestic indirect and direct sources
(taxes on goods and services and taxes on income and pro¯t). Winters et al.
(2001) explain that one of the reasons of the historical popularity of trade pro-
tection is that taxation of foreign trade is administratively easier than taxation
of domestic goods. This is so because typically foreign trade has a limited num-
ber of points of entry into the country. Consequently, focusing taxation e®orts
on the goods passing through these places can yield considerable revenue for
relatively little administrative cost.
The situation of most African economies is also worsen by their chronic
¯scal imbalances. In fact, for these countries, any loss of tax revenue due to
cuts in import tari®s or other trade taxes may generate further ¯scal instability
exacerbating their de¯cit thus worsening their already weak macroeconomic
3See IMF (1997) for a detailed explanation and review of case studies.
3status. This represents an important element because macroeconomic changes
play a crucial role in determining the success of a trade liberalization program.
For instance, the experience of many of the successfully liberalizing developing
countries has shown that the potential trade tax revenues losses following tari®
reduction can be o®set by a depreciation of real exchange rate.4 According to
Ebrill et al. (1999) trade liberalization in CFA African countries has been
proved not to decrease trade tax revenue only after the 1994 devaluation.5 It
is clear that trade interventions in the form of trade restrictions in Africa,
more than in any other country, have the aim to protect the economy and
generate revenues. These and other peculiar characteristics of the African
economies make it very interesting to analyze the revenue consequences of
trade liberalization with the aim to provide policy recommendations.
The goal of this paper is to determine whether controlling for macroeco-
nomic features of African economies and taking into account the existence of
political constraints that might either support or weaken the power of the
trade reform, a change in trade policy proxied by the e®ective rate of trade
taxation has a positive or negative e®ect on trade tax revenues. As stressed
above, the revenue e®ects of greater openness to international trade depend on
several initial conditions. In particular, it is interesting to consider the impact
on trade tax revenues of variation in the tari® rates starting from di®erent
levels of tari® protection. Thus, in this analysis we also check for the existence
of the so called "La®er e®ect". As we will point out in next section, the ex-
isting empirical literature focused on the revenue consequences of trade trade
reforms shows mixed results which stem mainly from substantial di®erences in
the country samples, the econometric methodology used, and di®erent de¯ni-
tion of trade restriction measures. We build on the existent empirical literature
by making use of a similar set of economic variables such as those describing
the macroeconomic environment and the level of development of a country.
One of the interesting contributions of this paper is the inclusion of a measure
of the credibility of the government that captures whether the impact on tax
revenues of a trade reform also depends on the governments ability, related to
political constraints, to commit to a policy reform. If we agree that trade lib-
eralization represents a huge challenge in particular for African countries due
to the issues we have just mentioned, then this work, based on a panel data set
of 53 African countries taken over the period 1970-2000, brings in the original
contribution of improving the understanding of the mechanisms underneath
4In general, the real e®ect of a decrease in value of a currency on trade tax revenue
cannot be known a priori but considering African countries where the demand for imports
is relatively inelastic a devaluation is likely to be revenue enhancing.
5The CFA franc devaluation was part of a broad adjusting reform program also supported
by the IMF.
4trade reforms in such a problematic continent. This paper also wants to show
that the contrasting results obtained in previous research e®orts have been
based on weak estimation methods that did not take into account the crucial
bias due to the presence of endogeneity. To do so we make use of sophisticated
estimation techniques based on the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
that allows to control for the bias due to the endogeneity of several of the
explanatory variables.
We ¯nd that for the sample of countries considered, higher openness to
trade although generating bene¯ts in the long run will have dangerous ¯scal
repercussion in the short run due to the potential reduction in trade tax rev-
enues induced by a reduction in import tari®s. We also detect the existence of
a La®er e®ect which signals that a further decrease in tari® reduction would
lead to a further decrease in trade tax revenue in African economies. We also
conclude that a devaluation of the domestic currency able to o®set at least part
of the potential losses in trade tax revenues would represent a valid strategy
that should accompany trade openness reforms. Along with these three major
¯ndings we stress the importance of both a stable economic environment and
a credible government in explaining the ability of a country to collect trade
tax revenues.
The paper is organized as follows. The next session illustrates the results of
the recent empirical literature on the relationship between trade liberalization
and taxation outcomes. Section 3 describes the dataset, giving a detailed ex-
planation of the explanatory variables used in the applied work, and the econo-
metric methodology applied in the empirical analysis. Section 4 shows the main
results and their robustness with respect to di®erent estimation methodology
and ¯nally, section 5 concludes.
2 Trade reform and tax revenues: the evidence
so far
Given the complexity in the implementation of a trade opening reform it is gen-
erally claimed that the revenue e®ects of trade liberalization can be evaluated
only through empirical analysis. Some recent empirical studies have attempted
to explain whether trade liberalization has resulted in a ¯scal hurdle due to a
severe reduction in tax revenue, mainly linked to a sharp decrease in custom
duties collection, or if greater international trade openness experienced by sev-
eral developing countries has had a positive impact on tax revenue. The results
obtained through empirical research do not always go in the same direction,
leaving the °oor open to further investigation, but also leaving policy makers
5with weak policy implications.
Notwithstanding the theoretical argument for a simultaneous tari® and
domestic tax system reform 6, establishing that any tari® reduction with a
simultaneous price-neutral consumption tax (i.e. VAT) will enhance both wel-
fare and net revenue (despite unchanged consumer prices negating a large part
of the gains from trade liberalization), there exists a considerable controversy
with respect to the feasibility of such a strategy in developing countries whose
ability to replace tari®s with a more sophisticated and well functioning domes-
tic taxation system has been questioned on structural and political-economy
grounds. Assessing the extent to which low-income countries that have im-
plemented signi¯cant tari® reforms while simultaneously trying to replace the
forgone tari® revenue with other taxes is a di±cult task. First, the quality of
government ¯nance data in developing countries is a serious concern. Second,
analysing the simple trends of trade tax and non-trade tax revenues, as it has
been done in some studies, may be misleading. This is especially the case given
that conclusions drawn from simple correlations are not conditioned to the ob-
served changes on relevant macroeconomic variables. Keen and Baunsgaard
(2004), attempted to correct this shortcoming by econometrically investigating
whether in practice countries have been able to recover the losses from trade
taxes with revenues from other sources conditioning the relationship between
the share of trade and non-trade tax revenue on a number of macroeconomic
indicators. They ¯nd that, in the low income country-group in their sample,
a reduction in trade tax revenues has been accompanied by a trend reduction
in total tax revenues.
Agbeyegbe et al. (2004), ¯nd timid positive relation between openness and
either trade tax revenue and total tax revenue in Sub-Saharan countries. In
particular, they ¯nd that the relationship between trade liberalization and tax
revenue is sensitive to the measure used to proxy trade. They conclude that
trade liberalization accompanied by an appropriate monetary and exchange
rate policy does not have a signi¯cant e®ect on overall tax revenue though
it may have some (positive) e®ect on income tax revenue. Contrary to this
result, Khattry and Rao (2002) ¯nd that the decline in trade tax revenue due
to reduced tari® protection joint with the inability of the government to collect
revenue from domestic taxation causes a decrease in total tax revenue. They
also discover the existence of a La®er e®ect which in accordance to this result
indicates that the low-income countries included in their data set are operating
on the rising part of the La®er curve. In line with the results found in Khattry
and Rao (2002), a recent article from the ATPC (African Trade Policy Centre,
2004) , shows that a reduction of the e®ective rate of trade taxation is followed
6See Keen and Ligthart (2002) for a detailed discussion.
6by a decrease in tax revenue because the potential increase in tari® collection
that higher trade volumes may lead to as a result of tari® cuts in most cases
is insu±cient to outweigh the revenue-dampening e®ect of the tax reductions.
Still, in accordance with the results in Khattry and Rao (2002) and Ebrill et
al. (1999) this work provides evidence of the existence of a La®er e®ect. In
particular the authors show that many economies, as a consequence of the
liberalization carried out during the 1990s, are now operating on the upward
sloping side of the La®er curve, meaning that a further reduction of trade
restrictiveness would generate reduction in revenues.
Adam et al. (2001) investigated the relationship between tax revenue,
exchange rate and openness in Sub-Saharan Africa employing dynamic panel
techniques. They ¯nd that openness raises overall tax revenue in CFA franc7
countries while it has little e®ect in non-CFA franc countries. The positive
e®ect is mainly driven by increased trade tax revenues while goods and services
tax revenues are actually lowered.
3 Methodology, data-set and variables
Our empirical investigation is based on a panel data-set of annual observations
on 53 African countries (see the Appendix for the list of countries) taken over
the period 1970-2000. The panel data set is the result of data collection from
a number of di®erent sources. The data related to the di®erent sources of
tax revenues are taken from the World Bank African Database (WBAD) while
most of the remaining economic data are taken from the WDI-2004 World Bank
data-set. Political data are taken from the Database of Political Institutions
(DPI), the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS), and Polity IV
data set. The appendix provides a precise description of data sources and
variable construction. In the following subsection we brie°y describe the choice
of the measure of trade openness and of the other variables used in the empirical
analysis.
3.1 How do we proxy trade openness / restriction ?
One of the main problems a researcher has to face when trying to explain the
relationship between trade liberalization and tax revenue is the choice of the
trade openness/restriction measure to use in the analysis. In the literature
di®erent types of measures of trade openness or trade restriction have been
considered and none of them is safe from critiques. After the work of Rodriguez
7The currency used by a group of countries in West and Central Africa.
7and Rodrik (1999), the measures that are mainly used in empirical research
are the e®ective rate of trade taxation and the collected tari® rate.
The e®ective rate of international trade taxation which is the index we use
in this paper is measured by the ratio of international trade taxes to the vol-
ume of international trade in imports and exports. This is an index of trade
restriction and measures how closed a trade regime is. Thus, as explained
in Khattry (2001), a drop in the index indicates greater trade liberalization,
while a rise in the index of trade restrictiveness indicates that economies have
become more closed as trade taxes relative to trade volumes have risen. This
index gives an idea of "realized" tari®s because the measure is based on how
much tari® revenue is actually collected. The measure will di®er from o±cial
tari®s because of imperfect collection and measurement errors. Although this
measure is recognized as a good proxy for trade restriction, it does have some
shortcomings. In particular, this index ignores the La®er E®ect by underesti-
mating the e®ect of extremely high tax rates that result in little revenue and
ignores the role of smuggling and other practices undertaken to evade taxes.
In addition, the index might judge an economy as becoming more restrictive
when it might become more liberal. This will occur when countries convert
quotas into equivalent tari®s. Nonetheless, given that changes in the denomi-
nator (trade volume) re°ect the net e®ect of all policy and exogenous changes,
the index implicitly incorporates the e®ects of changes in all trade barriers.
Moreover, the use of the e®ective rate of international trade taxation can be
strongly justi¯ed given the widespread data availability and the likelihood that
error measurement will be less than with other measures used in the literature.8
The second measure is the collected tari® rate. This is measured by the
ratio of import duties to the value of imports. Therefore, this measure does
not consider the export component of taxes and trade. Also in this case, a
decline in the index is taken to indicate greater trade openness.9
Another measure which is often used to proxy trade openness is the tradi-
tional measure of international trade as a share of GDP. In this case, a higher
ratio is taken to indicate a more opened trade regime. This measure, though,
has been object of critiques by many authors stemming from the fact that
imports and exports cannot be considered as exclusively due to trade policy.
In fact as stated by Rodrik (2000) "policy-makers do not directly control the
level of trade...the tools at the disposal of governments are tari® and non-tari®
barriers, not import or export levels".
8See the work of Dollar (1992), Pritchett (1996), Spilimbergo et al. (1999), Leamer
(1988), Hiscox and Kastner (2002) and Wacziarg and Welch (2005) for a detailed description
of alternative proxies of trade openness.
9For a discussion see Ebrill et al. (1999).
83.2 Dependent variable
The goal of this paper is to determine whether controlling for macroeconomic
stability of the economy and taking into account the existence of political
constraints that might either support or weaken the power of the trade reform,
a decrease in trade restriction proxied by the e®ective rate of trade taxation
has a positive or negative e®ect on trade tax revenue. Thus, the dependent
variable of the main regression is represented by the trade tax revenue-to-GDP
ratio (Tr), where taxes on international trade include import duties, export
duties, pro¯ts of export or import monopolies, exchange pro¯ts, and exchange
taxes.
3.3 Explanatory variables
The level of development and the structure of the economies under analysis
are described by the following variables.10
GDP per capita (Gdppc). Per capita GDP is included to capture the level
of development of a country. The underlying rationale is that higher income
countries tend to have a more monetized economy and better tax adminis-
tration, so GDP per capita is expected to have a positive relationship with
the overall tax revenue to GDP ratio and its domestic tax components, and a
more ambiguous relationship with trade tax revenue. Khattry and Rao (2002)
explain that contrary to what it should be expected, there might be a positive
relationship between trade tax revenue and per capita GDP due to the fact
that in low-income countries the income levels are so low that a higher income
might facilitate increased trade and thus higher trade tax revenue.
Agriculture and industry as share of GDP (Agri, Indu). This two variables
are used to characterize the structure of the production system of a country.
They can also be used to proxy the di±culties encountered by a low-income
country to collect revenue from domestic taxation. In many African economies
agricultural activities are organized on a small-scale basis which make them
di±cult to be taxed by the government. Thus, the share of agriculture is used
as a proxy to control for the di±culty in collecting taxes from this sector. The
industrial share in low income countries is used to proxy for mining share.
Urban population (Urban). As pointed out by part of the existing litera-
ture, a greater degree of urbanization generates either a greater need for public
services, hence increasing the need for tax revenue, and a greater capacity to
10See the appendix for a detailed description of these variables.
9tax given that it will lead to an enlargement of the taxable base as a result of
the concentration of economic activity in urban areas (Edwards and Tabellini,
1992). Urban population is also informative from a political point of view. In
particular it could incorporate information on the likelihood of a trade reform
to take place. Ancharaz (2003) claims that the urban population includes a
fairly large number of civil servants who derive their rents by administering
import controls and employee of heavily protected manufacturing sectors who
would be threatened by import liberalization. On the other hand, since most
imports to Africa are consumed in urban areas, it is fair to assume that high
trade restrictions that result in high living costs and a limited access to im-
ported goods will lead to the creation of groups lobbying in favor of import
liberalization.
In addition, we include macro variables according to the argument that the
macroeconomic environment (in particular macroeconomic stability) plays a
substantial role in the trade tax revenue outcome of trade policy reforms.
Real e®ective exchange rate (Reer). A devaluation of the exchange rate is
often a sound trade reform accompanying action. A devaluation of the ex-
change rate translates directly into changes in domestic collections on imports
and exports helping the economy to obviate balance of payment problems fol-
lowing tari® reduction. Given that in the short run aggregate elasticities of
import demand 11 might be quite inelastic because domestic consumers might
take some time to adjust their consumption choices to the new environment,
the valuation e®ect (the e®ect due to higher domestic currency value of im-
ports) might dominate the volume e®ect (the negative e®ect on trade revenue
due to the fall in imports), generating an increase in revenues from imports.
In°ation (In°a). A complete empirical investigation should take into ac-
count the e®ect of changes in macroeconomic variables on trade tax revenues.
As claimed above, trade liberalization is often accompanied by currency deval-
uation which might lead to higher in°ation. By introducing in°ation between
the regressors we are able to control for the e®ect of an increase in revenues
from export taxation due to an increase in export value ceteris paribus (i.e.
for the same export level) as a consequence of higher in°ation.
Aid per capita (Aid). Aids from international institutions can play an im-
portant role when a country decides to open up its economy to international
trade. In the presence of structural administration problems that prevent the
11See Kowalsky, 2005, p.31.
10government from collecting tax revenues from domestic taxation and in the
case in which trade liberalization leaded to a loss in trade and total tax rev-
enue, aids from the international community in the form of either loans or
grants would represent, in particular for African countries, a signi¯cant form
of alternative ¯nancing.
Government consumption (Govcon). It might be expected that government
consumption would be positively correlated with revenues, or some compo-
nents of it. With the inclusion of government consumption we control for the
possibility that countries undertaking liberalization, taking into account the
di±culties of the public system to improve its administration capacity and to
improve revenue collection via domestic taxation, might think to bu®er the
potential decrease in trade tax revenue by reducing their expenditure.
Public debt (Debt). We use total central debt as share of GDP as a control
variable which embodies the ¯nancial status of a country as a whole. Given
the economic environment in African countries, we assume that the higher the
level of debt the higher the reliance on trade tax revenues. Thus, the higher
the di±culties in reducing trade tari® barriers.
In order to capture the ability and the strength with which a government
can implement a trade policy and a ¯scal policy reform we do also consider a
measure of checks-and-balance borrowed from the political economy literature.
In particular we will show results obtained using the political constraint index
Polconv which estimates the feasibility of policy change in a country.
Total population (Pop). As it is usually done in the empirical literature,
we introduce the level of total population in order to control for the existence
of scale e®ects.
3.4 Methodology
In our analysis is important to use an estimation method that allows to control
for the bias due to the endogeneity of several of the explanatory variables. In
particular, it is reasonable to presume that in the equation for the share of
trade tax revenue on GDP (Tr), the variables related to government policy
decisions such as government consumption (Govcon) and the measure of trade
restriction (Itr) as well as some variables describing the macroeconomic en-
vironment (Reer) are likely to be endogenous. Taking this into account, we
¯rst test for the endogeneity of these explanatory variables and then start our
11analysis using a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework. Di®erent
GMM frameworks, such as the Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover
(1995) and the Arellano and Honore' (2000) methods, have been used in previ-
ous works in order to take the endogeneity problem into account. In our study
we will use three di®erent types of GMM estimators in order to support our
results with a strong and complete econometric strategy.
The ¯rst set of estimation results we show in the next paragraph is based
on a ¯xed-e®ects two-step e±cient GMM estimator of the panel data model
with endogenous regressors. This GMM estimator is able to generate e±cient
estimates of the coe±cients in the presence of both arbitrary heteroskedasticity
and arbitrary autocorrelation as well as consistent estimates of the standard er-
rors. The e±ciency gains of this estimator relative to the traditional IV/2SLS
estimator derive from the use of an optimal weighting matrix, the overidenti-
fying restrictions of the model, and the relaxation of the i.i.d. assumption. In
other words, ¯nal coe±cient estimates are obtained by ¯rstly estimating the
model using IV in order to get residual from which it is possible to estimate
the optimal weighting matrix that is successively used in the second step to
calculate the coe±cient GMM estimator and its variance-covariance matrix.12
The second econometric approach implemented in this paper is based on a
dynamic panel-data model, the "Arellano and Bond GMM" estimator (¯rst-
di®erence estimator), which includes the lagged dependent variable as regres-
sor. The innovation introduced by Arellano and Bond is based on the idea
that additional instruments can be obtained in a dynamic panel data model
if one utilizes the orthogonality conditions that exist between lagged values
of the dependent variable and the disturbances. Arellano and Bond (1991)
derived a GMM estimator for all the coe±cients in the di®erenced equation
of the original model which, given that random e®ects are removed after ¯rst
di®erencing, is estimable by IV. As valid instrumental variables they use, since
they are correlated with the right hand side variables but uncorrelated with the
¯rst-di®erenced idiosyncratic error term, lagged levels (one period lag in our
analysis) of the dependent variable, lagged levels (two or more periods) of the
endogenous variables, lagged levels (one or more periods) of the predetermined
variables and di®erences of the strictly exogenous variables. Then, using the
GMM framework it is possible to identify how many lags of the dependent,
of the predetermined, and of the endogenous variables are valid instruments,
and how to combine these lagged levels with ¯rst di®erences of the strictly
exogenous variables into a potentially very large instruments matrix by which,
performing GLS, the preliminary one-step consistent estimators are derived.
The third GMM estimator we consider is an extension of the Arellano
12Baum, Scha®er and Stillman (2003) explain this estimation procedure in details.
12and Bond dynamic panel-data just described. It is a one-step system GMM
estimator, ¯rst outlined by Arellano and Bover (1995) and fully developed by
Blundell and Bond (1998). The extension with respect to the Arellano and
Bond estimator is that the so called "System-GMM" introduces lags of ¯rst
di®erences predetermined and endogenous variables as further instruments for
predetermined and endogenous variables in levels. Moreover, we specify a set
of variables to be used as bases for the "GMM-style" estimator described in
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991). For each
time period, the estimator uses all available lags of the speci¯ed endogenous
variables in levels dated (t-1) or earlier as instruments for the ¯rst-di®erence
equations and uses the contemporaneous ¯rst di®erences as instruments in the
levels equations. In the speci¯cation we adopt for the GMM component of
this estimator we decide to make use only of the full set of available moment
conditions for the levels equations.
3.5 Instrumental variables
When implementing the ¯xed-e®ects two-step e±cient GMM estimator of the
panel data model we add to the internal set of instruments (the exogenous
variables in the regression) extra instrumental variables satisfying the property
of being uncorrelated to the error term but correlated with the endogenous
variables they have to instrument. Finding good instruments represents a
hard task, sometimes an art. Our choice of instruments is in line with what it
is frequently done in the empirical literature. We use the lagged values of the
endogenous variables up to time (t-2). As showed in table 2 our assumption on
the endogeneity of the index of trade restriction (Itr), government consumption
Govcon, and real e®ective exchange rate (Reer ) is supported by the outcome
of the endogeneity test we run. We are also comforted on the validity of our
chosen instruments by the outcome of the Hansen J-test for overidentifying
restriction which tells us that altogether our instruments are valid.
4 Econometric results
In this section we present the results obtained through the three di®erent GMM
estimators described in the previous paragraph.
Table 1 reports the coe±cient estimates of the following baseline regression
obtained from two-step e±cient GMM estimator:
Tr = ®1Itrit + ®2Itr2it + ®3Govconit + ®4Reerit + ®5Popit + ®6Gdppcit +
®7Inflait+®8Agriit+®9Induit+®10Urbanit+®11Polconvit+®12Debtit+¹i+"it
13The estimate coe±cient for Itr indicates a positive relation between the
index of trade restriction and the dependent variable (Tr) meaning that a re-
duction in trade taxes leads to a reduction in trade tax revenues. This result,
for sign and magnitude, is in line with the one obtained by Khattry and Rao
(2002) who also ¯nd a large trade-o® between reduced trade tax revenue and
reduced protection. The squared of the index of trade restriction (Itr2) has
been introduced assuming a non linear relationship between the e®ective rate
of trade taxation and costums revenue in order to control for the existence
of a La®er e®ect between those two variables. The negative and statistically
signi¯cant estimate coe±cient associated to Itr2 informs us that a La®er e®ect
is actually present between African economies, meaning that further reduction
in tari® protection will lead to an even more drastic reduction in trade tax
revenues collection. Khattry and Rao (2002) obtain an equivalent result con-
sidering low-income countries concluding that this group of countries have been
operating on the rising part of the La®er curve. The coe±cient on the real
e®ective exchange rate (Reer) has negative sign suggesting that a depreciation
raises trade tax revenue. We know, that many African countries, in particular
the CFA countries 13, have devalued their currency during the period under
analysis using macroeconomic policies to assist trade liberalization. Moreover,
as ¯gure 3 shows, export taxes are lower and less signi¯cant than import taxes
in Africa. Thus, the negative relationship between the real e®ective exchange
rate and the costum duties over GDP ratio, is due to the fact that aggregate
elasticities of import demand are inelastic in these countries (where a large
share of imports consists of price-ineleastic goods without domestic substi-
tutes 14) so that the valuation e®ect (the increase in the value of imported
goods in local currency terms as the exchange rate depreciates) dominates the
volume e®ect, leading to an overall increase in revenues from imports. The
results obtained for in°ation (In°a) and public debt (Debt), although small in
magnitude, show that countries characterized by an unstable economic envi-
ronment typically have a higher trade tax revenue to GDP ratio. Thus, there
is evidence that structural factors play a signi¯cant role in determining trade
tax revenue. In fact, while an increase of one percentage point in the urbaniza-
tion rate (Urban) leads to an increase of 0.22 percentage points in the costums
revenue, the estimate coe±cient on population size (Pop) shows the existence
of a negative scale e®ect. The result on Urban can be explained considering
that as urban population increases trade tax revenues might increase due to
the fact that the needs of people living in this areas have di®erent needs and
13The CFA frank was overvalued before the sharp depreciation occurred in 1994.
14See Ebrill et al. (1999).
14habits compared to people living in rural areas, needs that possibly can be
satis¯ed through imports. The insigni¯cance of coe±cients on GDP per capita
(Gdppc) is likely to be due to the fact that the sample considered is composed
of low-income countries only.
The positive relationship between the index of political constraint Polconv
and the dependent variable (Tr) leads us to the conclusion that an increase
in the credibility of a trade reform, due to the presence of higher and more
sophisticated measures of "checks and balances" in action during the discussion
and the decision over a new trade policy, leads to an increase in trade tax
revenue.
In order to provide further evidence on the validity of these results in table
2 we show the outcome of a series of tests aimed at verifying the validity of the
estimation method used and the robustness of the upshots obtained. We run a
di®erence-in-Sargan statistic to verify the endogeneity of the measure of trade
restrictiveness (Itr and Itr2), the real e®ective exchange rate (Reer) and the
measure of government consumption (Govcon). The endogeneity test is based
on the null hypothesis that the speci¯ed endogenous regressors can actually
be treated as exogenous. This endogeneity test is de¯ned as the di®erence of
two Hansen-Sargan statistics: one for the equation with the smaller set of in-
struments, where the suspect regressors are treated as endogenous, and one for
the equation with the larger set of instruments, where the suspect regressors
(suspect endogenous variables) are treated as exogenous.15 We reject the null
hypothesis that the speci¯ed endogenous regressors can actually be treated as
exogenous. This outcome allows us to fully justify the adoption of a GMM
estimation method. The essence of GMM is to utilize instruments (or orthogo-
nality conditions) in an optimal way in cases where there are more instruments
than endogenous variables (overidenti¯cation). Thus, it is key to test whether
the equation to estimate is underidenti¯ed, just-identi¯ed or overidenti¯ed,
or put it in another way, whether the excluded instruments (predetermined
regressors) are relevant. We verify this by mean of the Anderson canonical
correlation likelihood-ratio test based on the null hypothesis of underidenti¯-
cation.16 We reject the null of underidenti¯cation concluding that the equation
is at least identi¯ed and that the instruments are relevant.17
15The estimated covariance matrix used guarantees a non-negative test statistic, see Baum
et al. (2003).
16We test whether the matrix of reduced form coe±cients has rank = K ¡ 1, where
K is the number of regressors. The relevant statistic is distributed as a chi-squared with
degrees of freedom equal to (L - K - 1) where L is the number of both included instruments
(Pop, Gdppc, In°a, Agri, Indu, Urban, Aid, Polconv and Debt and excluded instruments
represented by their own lags.
17Nonetheless, we are aware of the claim made by Hall et al. (1996) who warn that a result
of rejection of the null should be treated with caution, because weak instrument problems
15Table 1: Trade tax revenues and trade liberalization: IV-GMM.
IV-GMM
Index of Trade Restriction (Itr) 0.682¤¤¤
(0.16)
Index of Trade Restriction squared (Itr2) -0.014¤¤
(0.01)
Government Consumption (Govcon) -0.074¤¤
(0.03)
Real E®ective Exchange Rate (Reer) -0.027¤¤¤
(0.00)
Public Debt (Debt) -0.003¤¤
(0.00)
Political constraint (Polconv) 0.733¤¤¤
(0.24)










Urban population (Urban) 0.224¤¤¤
(0.07)
Aid per capita (Aid) 0.112
(0.15)
R-squared 0.60
No. of Obs. 242
Note: Dependent variable is trade tax revenues over GDP (annual data over the period
for 1970-2000. Estimation is panel IV-GMM, Itr, Itr2, Govcon and Reer have been
instrumented with their own lags and included exogenous variables. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent levels respectively.
16We further check the validity of the instruments via the Hansen-Sargan test.
A test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the in-
struments are uncorrelated with the error term and the excluded instruments
(lags up to time (t ¡ 2) of the endogenous variables) are correctly excluded
from the estimated equation. Considering that we are using an e±cient GMM
estimator, the test statistic is the Hansen's J-statistic.18 We fail to reject the
null hypothesis, con¯rming the overall validity of the instrumental variables.
Finally, we control for the validity of the assumption that the regressors de-
¯ned as included instruments and introduced in the equation to model the
macroeconomic environment (i.e. in°ation , GDP per capita and public debt)
can actually be treated as exogenous. We implement a C-statistic19 on a subset
of the orthogonality conditions de¯ned as the di®erence of the Hansen-Sargan
statistic of the equation with the smaller set of instruments and the equation
with the full set of instruments which includes also the instruments whose va-
lidity needs to be checked. Under the null hypothesis that both the smaller
set of instruments and the additional, suspect instruments are valid, the C
statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of instruments tested. We
fail to reject the null hypothesis that the full set of orthogonality conditions
is valid coming to the conclusion that the included instruments are actually
exogenous and valid instruments.
Table 2: Test of endogeneity and exogeneity
Test Test Description P-Value
Di®erence-in-Sargan Statistic Endogeneity test 0.0360
Anderson corr. LR statistic Identi¯cation/IV relevance 0.0000
Hansen J Statistic Overidenti¯cation test 0.4853
Di®erence-in-Sargan Statistic Exogeneity test 0.8886
Note: Instrumented: Itr, Itr2, Govcon and Reer; Included instruments: Pop, Gdppc, In°a,
Agri, Indu, Urban, Aidpc, Polconv and Debt; Excluded instruments: Itr(t-1), Itr2(t-1),
Govcon(t-1), Reer(t-1), Itr(t-2), Itr2(t-2), Govcon(t-2) and Reer(t-2)
In what follows we present the results we obtain using the alternative GMM
estimators described above. Table 3 and table 5 show the results for the "Sys-
tem GMM" and "Arellano and Bond GMM" estimation methods, respectively.
The comparison of the results obtained with these two estimation tech-
niques with the results reported in table 7 allows us to understand whether
our results are consistent and robust. Moreover, given that both the "Arellano
may still be present.
18The minimized value of the GMM criterion function.
19Also known as "GMM distance" or "di®erence-in-Sargan" statistic.
17Table 3: Trade tax revenues and trade liberalization: System GMM.
System GMM
Trade Tax Revenues(t-1) (Tr(t-1)) 0.468¤¤¤
(0.03)
Index of Trade Restriction (Itr) 0.386¤¤¤
(0.04)
Index of Trade Restriction squared (Itr2) -0.008¤¤¤
(0.00)
Government Consumption (Govcon) 0.018¤
(0.01)
Real E®ective Exchange Rate (Reer) -0.008¤¤¤
(0.00)
Public Debt (Debt) -0.001¤
(0.00)
Political constraint (Polconv) 0.332¤
(0.17)










Urban population (Urban) 0.043¤¤¤
(0.01)




Note: Dependent variable is trade tax revenues over GDP (%), annual data over the
period for 1970-2000. Estimation is System-GMM. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
levels respectively.
18Table 4: Test of endogeneity and autocorrelation: "System GMM"
Test Description P-Value
Sargan test of overid. restrictions 0.980
(*) Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.000
(**) Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.183
Note: (*) Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order 1 in di®erenced residuals; H0:
no autocorrelation. (**) Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 in di®erenced
residuals; H0: no autocorrelation.
and Bond" and the "System-GMM" estimators contemplate the lag of the de-
pendent variable among the regressors, we are able to control for the persistence
in the trade tax revenues which characterize African economies. Independently
from the method used to estimate the equation representing the e®ect of trade
liberalization on trade tax revenue, the coe±cient estimates of the measure of
trade restrictiveness (Itr) other than having a similar magnitude always show
a positive sign and are highly statistically signi¯cant (99% level). Also the
coe±cient estimates of the squared of the e®ective rate of international trade
taxation. (Itr2), which are signi¯cant at the 99% level in the case of "System
GMM" and "Arellano and Bond GMM", show a similar magnitude and the
same negative sign con¯rming the existence of a La®er e®ect. The same con-
clusion holds in the case of the coe±cient estimates Reer and In°a. In fact, the
real e®ective exchange rate keeps showing a negative sign and a similar mag-
nitude while the measure of in°ation shows a positive sign, similar magnitude
and statistical signi¯cance (although at di®erent levels) independently from
the choice of the estimator. In the case of population size (Pop) and share of
urban population (Urban) the coe±cients estimates maintain the same sign,
negative and positive respectively, are statistically signi¯cant even though at
di®erent level of signi¯cance, but show di®erent magnitude depending on the
estimator applied. Considering all the independent variables in the regressions,
only the estimated coe±cient for the share of industrial activities (Indu) and
per capita GDP (Gdppc) turn out to be never signi¯cant. Nonetheless, (Indu
maintains the same negative sign and magnitude under all the three estimators.
The coe±cient estimates of agriculture share (Agri), aid per capita (Aidpc),
the index of political constraint Polconv and public debt Debt are not always
statistically signi¯cant independently on the type of estimator adopted. For
example, the coe±cient estimates on agriculture share, which show the same
negative sign and the same magnitude under the three estimation methods,
turns out to be statistical signi¯cant (at the 99% level) only in the results
obtained through "System GMM". In the case of aids per capita, statistical
signi¯cance still emerges only in the case of "System GMM", but in this case,
19Table 5: Trade tax revenues and trade liberalization: Arellano and Bond.
Arellano and Bond (AB)
Trade Tax Revenues (t-1) (Tr(t-1)) 0.151¤
(0.032)
Index of Trade Restriction (Itr) 0.435¤
(0.042)
Index of Trade Restriction squared (Itr2) - 0.006¤
(0.001)
Government Consumption (Govcon) - 0.022¤¤¤
(0.013)
Real E®ective Exchange Rate (Reer) - 0.013¤
(0.001)
Population (Pop) - 1.789¤¤¤
(0.954)








Urban population (Urban) 0.134¤¤
(0.053)
Aid per capita (Aid) 0.092
(0.073)
Political constraint (Polconv) 0.059
(0.197)
Public Debt (Debt) -0.0003
(0.000)
Note: Dependent variable is trade tax revenues over GDP (%), annual data over the
period for 1970-2000. Estimation method is one-step Arellano and Bond GMM.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**,* denote
signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
20Table 6: Test of endogeneity and autocorrelation: AB "di®erence GMM".
Test Description P-Value
Sargan test of overid. restrictions 1.000
(*) Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)* 0.000
(**) Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)** 0.815
Note: (*) Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0; H0:
no autocorrelation. (**) Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of
order 2 is 0; H0: no autocorrelation.
although the coe±cient estimates keep the same positive sign, the magnitude
of the coe±cients are similar only in the cases of "Fixed E®ects GMM" and
"Arellano and Bond GMM". The variable Polconv, instead, keeps always the
same positive sign but it is statistical signi¯cant and show similarity in the
magnitude only when either the "Fixed E®ect GMM" or the "System GMM"
are implemented. The coe±cient estimates on government consumption (Gov-
con), although always statistically signi¯cant (from 90% to 95% signi¯cance
level), show di®erent outcomes in terms of sign and magnitude. It shows a
negative sign in the case of "Fixed E®ects GMM" and "Arellano and Bond
GMM" estimators but a positive sign when the "System GMM" is applied.
Moreover, the coe±cients show di®erent magnitudes according to the estima-
tion technique applied. Altogether, a part from the di®erences listed above,
we can conclude that our results are fairly stable across di®erent estimation
methods thus con¯rming the robustness of the main ¯ndings and conclusions
reported in table 1.
Tables 4 and 6 report the outcomes of the Arellano and Bond tests for
autocorrelation and the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, for the
"System" and the "Di®erence" estimator respectively. Arellano and Bond
developed a test for autocorrelation of ¯rst and second order in the ¯rst dif-
ferenced residuals.20 They state that autocorrelation of order 1 (AR(1)) is
expected in ¯rst di®erences, because ¢²i;t = ²i;t ¡ ²i;t¡1 should correlate with
¢²i;t¡1 = ²i;t¡1 ¡ ²i;t¡2 since they share the ²i;t¡1 term. Therefore, to check
for AR(1) in levels, they propose to look for AR(2) in di®erences, on the idea
that this will detect the relationship between the ²i;t¡1 in ¢²i;t and the ²i;t¡2
in ¢²i;t¡2. Autocorrelation indicates that lags of the dependent variable (and
any other variables used as instruments that are not strictly exogenous), are
in fact endogenous, thus bad instruments.21 Moreover, while the presence of
20Autocorrelation of ¯rst and second order in the ¯rst di®erenced residuals imply respec-
tively: E[¢²i;t¢²i;t¡1] 6= 0] and E[¢²i;t¢²i;t¡2] 6= 0.
21For example, if there is AR(s), then yi;t¡s would be correlated with ²i;t¡s, which would
be correlated with ¢²i;t¡s , which would be correlated with ¢²i;t.
21Table 7: Trade tax revenues and trade liberalization: comparing results.
IV-GMM System GMM AB
Trade Tax Revenues(t-1) (Tr(t-1)) 0.469¤¤¤ 0.151¤
(0.03) (0.032)
Index of Trade Restriction (Itr) 0.682¤¤¤ 0.386¤¤¤ 0.435¤
(0.16) (0.04) (0.042)
Index of Trade Restriction squared (Itr2) -0.014¤¤ -0.008¤¤¤ - 0.006¤
(0.01) (0.00) (0.001)
Government Consumption (Govcon) -0.074¤¤ 0.018¤ - 0.022¤¤¤
(0.03) (0.01) (0.013)
Real E®ective Exchange Rate (Reer) -0.027¤¤¤ -0.008¤¤¤ - 0.013¤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.001)
Public Debt (Debt) -0.003¤¤ -0.001¤ -0.0003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.000)
Political constraint (Polconv) 0.733¤¤¤ 0.332¤ 0.059
(0.24) (0.17) (0.197)
GDP per-capita (Gdppc) -0.603 -0.069 0.191
(0.74) (0.08) (0.346)
Agriculture (Agri) -0.008 -0.034¤¤¤ - 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.008)
Industry (Indu) -0.002 -0.007 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.008)
Population (Pop) -3.213¤¤¤ -0.363¤¤¤ - 1.789¤¤¤
(0.97) (0.06) (0.954)
In°ation (In°a) 0.005¤¤ 0.003¤¤ 0.002¤¤
(0.00) (0.00) (0.001)
Urban population (Urban) 0.224¤¤¤ 0.043¤¤¤ 0.134¤¤
(0.07) (0.01) (0.053)
Aid per capita (Aid) 0.112 0.231¤¤¤ 0.092
(0.15) (0.06) (0.073)
Note: Dependent variable is trade tax revenues as percentage of GDP, annual data over
the period for 1970-2000. Estimation is panel IV-GMM in column 1, System-GMM in
column 2 and Arellano and Bond in column 3. In col. 1 Itr, Itr2, Govcon and Reer have
been instrumented with their own lags. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors reported
in parentheses. ***,**,* denote signi¯cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
22second-order autocorrelation in the di®erenced residuals would imply that the
estimates are inconsistent, they show that the estimates are still consistent
in the presence of ¯rst-order autocorrelation in the ¯rst-di®erenced residuals.
In our case, for both estimators, we reject the null of no autocorrelation of
order 1 in the di®erenced residuals, but we cannot reject the null of no au-
tocorrelation of order 2. Therefore, we are comforted with the results that
past lags of the dependent and of the other not strictly exogenous variables
(lagged variables used to instrument the endogenous variables) are valid in-
struments thus con¯rming the consistency of the estimated coe±cients. The
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions tests the hypothesis that the in-
strumental variables are uncorrelated to some set of residuals, and therefore
they are acceptable instruments. If the null hypothesis is not rejected the in-
struments pass the test. As reported in tables 4 and 6, we cannot reject the
null that the set of instruments are valid altogether, either for the "System"
and the "Di®erence" estimators.
5 Conclusions
Considering a panel data set on 53 African countries for the period 1970-2000
we empirically analyzed the relationship between trade liberalization and trade
tax revenues. Previous empirical studies addressed the same issue, reaching
mixed conclusions. The main result of this paper is that there exists a large
trade o® between a greater degree of openness to international trade and the
revenue collected from import and export taxation. This outcome, obtained
taking into account a policy measure of trade restriction, countries macroe-
conomic conditions, the ability of the governments to issue a credible trade
reform, initial economic conditions, duties, which represents by far the highest
share in government total revenue. Moreover, we also ¯nd that the relationship
between trade taxes and trade tax revenues is non linear, giving credit to the
existence of a La®er e®ect. This means that, in aggregate, African countries
are operating on the rising side of an inverse U-shaped curve, indicating that a
further decrease in tari® reduction can only lead to a further decrease in trade
tax revenue. Therefore, an increase in trade openness not accompanied by a
strong reform of the domestic taxation system would do more harm than good,
because losing revenue from trade taxation without being able to compensate
this loss with increased revenue collection from domestic taxation would ulti-
mately decrease total tax revenues, which in turn would result in exacerbating
the already more than precarious ¯scal de¯cit and total debt position of these
countries. In order to achieve revenue protection after trade liberalization
these countries will be due to strength their administrative ability in order to
23increase collection from domestic taxation, for example introducing or improv-
ing the VAT, and improving direct taxation. If African countries will not meet
this goal, this might have negative repercussions on the spending side of the
government behavior, with governments reducing important spending items
like health, education and social security which will badly e®ect the poorest
segment of the society. We con¯rm the prediction based on case studies that
trade openness reforms should be accompanied by a devaluation of the do-
mestic currency in order not to generate ¯scal instability and we support the
role of a stable economic environment in facilitating the ability of a country
to improve the collection of costum duties. Very interestingly we are also able
to conclude that, along with the stability of macroeconomic conditions, the
credibility of the policy implemented by the government and its ability to stick
to taken decisions might play a role in determining taxation outcome before
and after the introduction of tari® reduction measures.
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Trade Tax Revenues (Tr): Trade tax revenue as share of GDP (%). Taxes
on international trade include import duties, export duties, pro¯ts of export
or import monopolies, exchange pro¯ts, and exchange taxes. Current revenue
includes all revenue from taxes and nonrepayable receipts (other than grants)
from the sale of land, intangible assets, government stocks, or ¯xed capital as-
sets, or from capital transfers from nongovernmental sources. It also includes
¯nes, fees, recoveries, inheritance taxes, and nonrecurrent levies on capital.
Data are shown for central government only. Calculated from WBAD data.
Index of Trade Restriction (Itr): E®ective rate of international trade tax-
ation. Measured by the ratio of international trade taxes to the volume of
international trade in imports and exports. Calculated from WBAD data.
Index of Trade Restriction squared (Itr2): E®ective rate of international
trade taxation squared. Calculated from WBAD data.
Government Consumption (Govcon): Government consumption as share
of GDP (%). Government consumption includes all government current ex-
penditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of em-
ployees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security,
but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government
capital formation (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
Real E®ective Exchange Rate (Reer): Real e®ective exchange rate index
(1995 = 100). It is the nominal e®ective exchange rate (a measure of the value
of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided
by a price de°ator or index of costs (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
Population (Pop): Log of total population. Total population is based on
the de facto de¯nition of population, which counts all residents regardless of
legal status or citizenship{except for refugees not permanently settled in the
country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their
country of origin (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
GDP per capita (Gdppc): Log of GDP per capita (Const. 1995 US$). GDP
per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus
30any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fab-
ricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are
in constant U.S. dollars (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
In°ation (In°a): Percentage change in CPI. Consumer price index re°ects
changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a ¯xed basket of goods
and services that may be ¯xed or changed at speci¯ed intervals, such as yearly.
The Laspeyres formula is generally used (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
Agriculture (Agri): Agriculture, value added (% of GDP). Agriculture cor-
responds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and ¯shing, as
well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Value added is the net
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate in-
puts. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value
added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classi¯cation
(ISIC), revision 3 (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
Industry (Indu): Industry as share of GDP (%).Industry corresponds to
ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It
comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate
subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate in-
puts. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value
added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classi¯cation
(ISIC), revision 3.
Urban population (Urban): Urban population (% of total). Urban popu-
lation is the share of the total population living in areas de¯ned as urban in
each country (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
Aid per capita (Aid): Log of Aid per capita (current US$). Aid per capita
includes both o±cial development assistance (ODA) and o±cial aid, and is
calculated by dividing total aid by the midyear population estimate (Source:
WDI-2004 World Bank).
Political constraint (Polconv): Political constraint index. This measure
of political constraints estimates the feasibility of policy change (the extent to
which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in gov-
31ernment policy) using the following methodology. First, extracting data from
political science databases, it identi¯es the number of independent branches of
government (executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) with veto power
over policy change in 234 countries in every year that they existed from 1800
to 2001. The preferences of each of these branches and the status quo policy
are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform,
unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation of a
quantitative measure of institutional hazards using a simple spatial model of
political interaction. This initial measure is then modi¯ed to take into ac-
count the extent of alignment across branches of government using data on the
party composition of the executive and legislative branches. Such alignment
increases the feasibility of policy change. The measure is then further modi¯ed
to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch
which increases (decreases) decision costs of overturning policy for aligned (op-
posed) executive branches (Source: Henisz (2000).
Public Debt (Debt): Central government debt, total (% of GDP). Total debt
is the entire stock of direct, government, ¯xed term contractual obligations to
others outstanding at a particular date. It includes domestic debt (such as
debt held by monetary authorities, deposit money banks, non¯nancial public
enterprises, and households) and foreign debt (such as debt to international
development institutions and foreign governments). It is the gross amount of
government liabilities not reduced by the amount of government claims against
others. Because debt is a stock rather than a °ow, it is measured as of a
given date, usually the last day of the ¯scal year. Data are shown for central
government only (Source: WDI-2004 World Bank).
32Data source
Variable Description Source
Tr Trade tax revenue as share of
GDP (%)
WBAD data
Itr E®ective rate of international
trade taxation
WBAD data
Itr2 E®ective rate of international
trade taxation squared
WBAD data
Govcon Government consumption as
share of GDP (%)
WDI
Reer Real e®ective exchange rate in-
dex (1995=100)
WDI
Pop Log of total population WDI
Gdppc Log of GDP per capita (Const.
1995 US$)
WDI
In°a Change in CPI (%) WDI
Agri Agriculture, value added (% of
GDP)
WDI
Indu Industry, value added (% of
GDP)
WDI
Urban Urban population (% of total) WDI
Aid Log of aid per capita (current
US$)
WDI
Polconv Political constraint index Henisz (2000)
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Botswana Ghana Rwanda
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Cape Verde Kenya Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Lesotho Somalia
Chad Liberia South Africa
Comoros Libya Sudan
Congo Madagascar Swaziland
Congo, Democratic Republic Malawi Tanzania
Cote d' Ivoire Mali Togo
Djibouti Mauritania Tunisia
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Figure 4: Import duties and taxes on exports as share of GDP
36